The debate over the right approach to the tragedy that is unfolding in Syria has sharply polarized the foreign policy community. In the past months, advocates of stronger US involvement seemed irreconcilably opposed to proponents of non-involvement—a rift that divides academia, political analysts, Capitol Hill and even the national security team of President Obama. However, as the fighting escalates, the two sides appeared to hesitantly converge on some aspects. Critics of intervention might have noted that the option of a Libya-style bombing campaign has widely disappeared from the discourse. At the same time, even proponents of a hands-off approach grudgingly concede that a workable strategy to alleviate the suffering must include some military elements.

It appeared to me that the latest policy brief of Dr. Lynch corroborates this trend (henceforth, direct quotes from the document appear in bold). Although the focus remains on avoiding direct US involvement, many in the more hawkish camp might find themselves nodding along with many points that are being made. First and foremost, there seems to be consensus over the objective for Syria. Both sides would likely subscribe to the objective defined by former ambassador Frederic C. Hof: a Syria with an inclusive civil society and government that is inclined to cooperate with the US, breaks with Iran and Hezbollah, renounces terrorism, and commits to nonviolence and the Middle East peace process. There is also consensus that no decent outcome can be achieved with a political arrangement that includes President Bashar al-Assad who is “too fully implicated in massive atrocities to be included in any political transition” implying that “the US should remain focused on the ultimate objective of replacing the Assad regime”. Similarly, hawks and doves cry out in unison for the delivery of direct humanitarian aid to opposition-held areas, if necessary without UN backing, and for greater efforts to organize and unify the opposition in exile. Finally, there is consensus that Assad and his cronies must be prosecuted and that “there should be no tradeoff between expediency and justice” (remember Hillary Clinton’s bizarre charade).

The most controversial point is obviously the recommendation not to arm the rebels. I would like to focus on this issue and highlight some aspects where one might possibly come to other conclusions. Lest my comments seem overly critical, I would like to emphasize that I agree on many (perhaps most) of the arguments of the policy brief. My presentation will focus on the more controversial points to stimulate the debate and avoid redundancy.

A convincing case for arming the Syrian rebels would have to satisfy three main conditions:

(1) The arms must provide a tangible military advantage that allows rebels to challenge Assad’s grip on his strongholds.
(2) The political and military risks of providing the weapons must be managable.
(3) The provision of arms must facilitate, not impede, a diplomatic settlement.

Condition 1: military edge. Perhaps the most serious argument brought forth against arming the rebels is that it might not significantly change the realities on the ground: “Those who advocated arming the rebels did not offer a convincing case that these arms would tip the balance of the conflict”. To predict how arming the rebels would impact the military balance, it is important to look at the capabilities of both sides.

To begin with, many observers have grossly overstated the strength of Assad’s military. It is getting increasingly obvious that the rebels are fighting an incompetent army whose equipment belongs in a museum. As pointed out by Jeffrey White, a military analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the regime has three main advantages over the rebels: (1) heavy armor and mechanized brigades, (3) indirect fire weapons and artillery, and (3) its airforce. According to another analysis, the main military challenge for the rebels is attacking bases and airfields that lay in flat terrain that can easily be defended against an infantry onslaught even by a small garrison. Several military bases lay under siege across the country (e.g., Menakh airbase, Aleppo international airport, Wadi Al-Dayf military base) with ill-equipped rebels being unable to deal the final blow.

Indirect fire weapons and anti-tank guided missiles would change the equation significantly, giving the rebels the ability to attack tanks and buildings from a distance, disable runways and destroy aircraft on the ground.

At the moment, however, they have just a handful of METIS anti-tank systems and only a few old mortars and field guns across the country. More of these weapons and a more steady and reliable supply of ammunition could enable the rebels to close all three gaps to the regime that remain in terms of military capability within a reasonable amount of time.

Despite their limited weaponry, the rebels have already captured some airfields. Further, the Syrian airforce suffers due to the rebels’ (limited) access to anti-aircraft weapons and “the strains put on its fleet by its own operational tempo”. Giving the rebels the ability to attack and capture regime bases and airfields more quickly would deal a significant blow to the regime. US military brass go as far as predicting the regime would collapse if its airforce could be defeated:

WSJ military planning staff: Imposing NFZ over western Syria causes Assad regime to collapse. http://t.co/4DCrhg8z

— Micah Zenko (@MicahZenko) February 1, 2013

A more abundant and reliable arms supply would allow the rebels to capture remaining airfields in the North, cut off supply routes of key cities (Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir Al-Zour) and seize them eventually. After consolidating their hold on the northern provinces, the insurgents could advance to the coastal city of Lattakia and threaten Assad’s tribal heartland. Even today, Assad’s hometown Qardaha is almost within reach of the insurgents. However, absent more firepower, their progress is painfully slow and still too often, they find themselves outgunned, fighting tanks with only light weapons.

We do not know the details of the plan that Mr Petraeus and then-secretary Clinton have proposed last year. What we can say is that it was convincing enough to earn the support of some of the highest civilian and military leaders of the United States. What is more, the case that providing weapons to the rebels would help them push Assad from power had already been made by Admiral James Stavridis in March 2012 at a time when the insurgency was still in its infancy.

Assad will not agree to a negotiated exit as long as he thinks he is winning. Military pressure is the only way to make him change his calculus. As things stand right now, arming the rebels is the only feasible way to achieve this goal. Needless to say, this would not mean to enable the rebels to overrun the whole country and defeat his army in its entirety. The objective of arming the rebels would be to make his situation militarily untenable so that he (or his Alawite backers) agree to hand over power.

Condition 2: managable risks. Naturally, providing arms to Syrian insurgents is not without risks, the most important one being that arms flows cannot be fully controlled and at least some of them may end up in the hands of extremists. It goes without saying that arms should not be dropped with parachutes over opposition-held areas. Instead, any weapons should be provided to carefully vetted groups that are willing to work constructively with the West during the revolt and after Assad has been removed. No weapons that could endanger Israel or the armed forces of Western allies in the region should be supplied. Antitank weaponry can be calibrated to pierce lower-grade Syrian armor without posing a threat to more advanced Israeli or Western-made tanks. Older generation anti-tank missiles and artillery are unlikely to pose a significant threat to a well-equipped army.

Of course, residual risks will remain and the months after Assad falls will need tireless efforts to integrate the various militias into a framework of national security forces and to encourage people to hand in or sell their arms (whoever supplied them) to government institutions. The policy brief states that “most of the weapons which [the US] might plausibly offer would not be enough to defeat the Syrian military”. However, as outlined above, there might be no need for shoulder-fired missiles, which are the most delicate and risky items. This assumption is echoed, among others, by a former marine who has travelled with the rebels for several weeks (and is now reportedly in regime custody):

@TarantinoDork & my (implied) arg here http://t.co/ug0QP2a6 is that SAMs aren't really needed. (Cont)

— Austin Tice (@Austin_Tice) July 1, 2012

Condition 3: facilitating a political solution. All parties of the conflict accept that there must be a political solution, not a military solution in which one side conquers the other. The Khatib initiative, though badly timed, ill-conceived and amateurishly communicated, provides a glimmer of hope that “… parts of the opposition and parts of the Syrian regime are finally reaching the point where they could contemplate a deal.” However, there is one person that does not seem to be in the mood for negotiations: Bashar el-Assad has no intentions of stepping aside.

Rather than seeing diplomacy and military assistance as mutually exclusive strategies, they should be used in a complementary fashion to hasten the regime’s demise. This is how similar conflicts were brought to an end. Analysts often invoke the civil war in Bosnia as a parallel for Syria. In this conflict, a political solution was hammered out through nonstop diplomatic efforts of the US and her partners. However, few would argue that the steadily increasing military pressure was a major factor in bringing Milosevic to the negotiating table. This only happened after the West canceled the arms embargo against Bosnian rebels and the fortune in the battlefield shifted decisively against the Serbs with key regions like the Krajina being overrun by Croatian forces and other defeats looming.

Diplomacy can only prevail if the opposition makes military gains up to a point that Assad sees the light or his Alawite backers feel ready to jettison him. Right now, Assad is still seen as a savior for too many in the Alawite community that keeps him in power. Until we come to a point where Assad becomes their problem, no political solution can be brought about. Providing arms to the rebels would not supplant the diplomatic track. It would not mean giving up on a negotiated settlement and banking on a military victory of the opposition. What it could do is to help convince Assad that his time is up and thereby pave the way for a political solution.

The US government might finally decide that the drawbacks of providing arms directly to the rebels weigh too heavily. Nonetheless, it will have to deal with a situation in which weapons from different sources are already flowing into Syria. In this environment, the policy brief suggests that the US “coordinate the military and civilian aid that Syria is already receiving” rather than “adding American arms to the bazaar”. Vetting rebel groups and tracing the flows of arms would help reconcile conflicting objectives among US partners involved in Syria, but it would not be enough to affect the trajectory of the conflict. In order to change the military realities on the ground and Assad’s calculations, the US would have to support and encourage US allies to provide weapons more effectively, more accountably and in greater quantities.

Syria has reached a point where military assistance and diplomatic efforts are two sides of the same medal. One cannot succeed without the other.

Syria:To intervene or not to intervene?

Whether the West should intervene militarily in Syria is now largely a question of how people believe things will play out in case of intervention and non-intervention. There is no algorithm to weigh different options and reach the best solution. It’s a matter of expectations of future events in either case.

My opinion is the following: if we credibly threaten intervention now, there is a good chance that we actually will not have to intervene. If the threat is credible, Assad’s cronies (perhaps he himself, too) and his military commanders will see the game is up and embark on a political process that best preserves their interests and that of their Alawite community. We can manage and influence the transition and push the process toward a favorable outcome, most likely Exile for Assad’s top-brass and a democratic transition that guarantees minority rights including for the Alawites.

If Assad and his entourage remain intransigent, we would have to follow through on our threat of military intervention. That is, we establish a no-flight zone, bomb Assad’s army into the dirt and arm insurgent groups that agree to subject themselves under political control (preferably through the Syrian National Council) and commit to democracy and human rights. Arguably, that is the second-best solution. However, at this point in time, there is a fair chance that we will be able to channel the insurgency and transition according to our strategic priorities and preferences. As we would have considerable influence on the insurgents on the ground (they are effectively at our mercy as the Iraqis were in 1991), we would be able to prevent or at least drastically limit reprisals against the Alawite community (by now it seems we don’t have to worry too much about Christians).

Is there a chance that militants could try to take advantage of the power vacuum? Absolutely. But lest we forget: the peaceful protests and the pro-democracy movement are very much alive. If we intervene now and show the Syrian people we are on their side, we would be able to squelch militant and anti-Western elements. And it should be expected that the people will remember our heeding to their desperate calls for help.

If we do NOT intervene and let things play out for some months to come, the insurgency will grow, and it will get more sectarian and militant. Assad will not reassert control of his country any time soon, perhaps he will never be able to do so. Syria will be an impoverished failed state, wrecked by violence, extremism and civil war. We will have to cope with the fallout of the crisis for years. Allowing Syria to descend into mayhem would entail a destabilization of the region, economic stagnation in the whole Levant, expanding influence of Iran and a plethora of refugees.

What’s more, Assads henchmen will bring their atrocities to levels unseen before, and the escalation of violence may force us or our allies (especially Turkey) to intervene at a later stage where our options and prospects are not remotely as benign as they are today. Perhaps worst of all, our ability to control the insurgents and sway the transition process will be more and more limited the longer we allow the killing to go on. While we right now have a decent chance of channeling the course of events in our favor and controling the insurgency, I expect we will be in a much worse position several months down the road.

As with the darkest hours of the 1990s, we will wish we had acted earlier and more decisively.

Libya bans religious parties from politics

http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/2012425134112668493.html

More good news from Libya. Religious parties banned from politics. Recent developments expose how wrong critics of the intervention (and Qadhafi propaganda) were when suggesting Libya would fall to religious extremists after the regime falls.

And, by the way, the same talk has started regarding Syria, too.

Comment on Marc Lynch’s testimony “Confronting Damascus: U.S. Policy toward the Evolving Situation in Syria, Part II.”

In the above mentioned testimony, Marc Lynch (tweeting @abuaardvark) provided a thorough analysis of the situation in Syria and recommended policy options the United States should persue in response to the evolving crisis. Drawing on analogies of interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, he recommends that the United States take off the table any military option and confine itself to targeted sanctions and diplomatic pressure on the regime and its allies. The analysis is very thoughtful and sheds light on many different facets of the problem, but this appears to be the punchline.

While the testimony yields important food-for-thought for anyone favoring intervention in Syria, I believe one might reach different conclusions regarding a number of arguments, collectively calling into question the wisdom of the recommended non-interventionist policy. I would like to provide some thoughts on those arguments where I believe we have reason to consider different interpretations. To provide my assessment succinctly, I will proceed through the issues point-by-point in the order I encountered them in the testimony.

(1) “There are no cheap or easy forms of military intervention…”
What is meant by “cheap” and “easy”? What is the benchmark for an “easy” intervention? Libya? Kosovo? Might our allies in the Gulf be prepared to contribute to the funding? I would think so.

(2) “…arming the Syrian opposition, would likely spread the violence and increase the numbers of Syrian dead without increasing the likelihood of regime collapse.”
While I agree arming the opposition would raise the level of violence in the short term, I find surprising that the author draws the conclusion it may not increase the likelihood of regime collapse. This assertion contradicts the view of Adm. John Stavridis who testified that arming the rebels would help the opposition to push Assad from power. (http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/02/top_us_admiral_arming_the_syrian_rebels_would_help_oust_assad)

• Assad’s crackdown involves for the most part Soviet ear helicopter and 40 year-old APCs and tanks.
• How could one deny modern anti-tank and air-defence equipment would make a significant difference?
• What would be the impact on Assad troops’ morale if their casualties, which are minimal so far, mount?
• Could rebels carve out a safe-haven on their own in Idlib where the terrain gives them an advantage for their guerilla operations?
• Would Assad need to deploy more troops and armor against a well-armed insurgency? What would that mean for his resources, funding and command&control capacities?
• The author seems to ignore to ignore these questions and the testimony of military commanders altogether stating that not even the likelihood of ousting Assad would improve if rebels were armed.

(3) “An initially limited intervention would most likely pave the way to
more direct and expensive involvement comparable to the experience in Iraq.”
While I agree mission creep is a valid concern, I disagree with the assessment that this will “most likely” happen. In particular, the author does not discuss how that risk can be limited, and I think there are many ways for doing so. In Libya, it took 6 months to rout Qadhafi from the capital Tripoli because the military operation was not backed by the necessary assets and political will to bring about a fast solution. NATO flew ~40 strike sorties a day, compared to 150 in Kosovo. Rotary-wing aircraft were deployed months after the campaign had started and powerful air assets such as the AC-130 were withheld altogether after the initial attack phase in March. The assessment is lacking a discussion of the circumstances under which the likelihood of mission creep can be reduced and should elaborate in more detail why intervention in Syria would “most likely” morph into an Iraq-style intervention.

(4) “The ceasefire for which the United Nations called has not ended the killing, but it has substantially reduced the violence even before the entry of the full international monitoring mission.”
In light of the recent shelling and massacres in Hama and elsewhere, this assessment does not capture the realities on the ground.

(5) “Economic sanctions are taking a real toll on an increasingly isolated Syrian regime.”
My personal impression (without having good or reliable data) is that the regime is coping very well with the sanctions. The Syrian pound has not collapsed and economic activity declined by a modest 2% in 2011 according to the IMF (http://m.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17344858). Moreover, it is safe to say that the sanctions have not impeded, let alone halted, the crackdown. Sanctions have not and will not halt the crackdown. It is an illusion to suggest otherwise.

(6) “[The US]  should continue to lead international efforts at the United Nations, promote the demilitarization of the conflict, continue to increase the pressure on the Assad regime, build on the efforts underway with the “Friends of Syria” group, support the political development of the Syrian opposition, and prepare the ground for future accountability for war crimes.”
I fully concur with all of these points, but I object against depicting these activities and military threats/pressure as mutually exclusive options. Instead, why not pursue them in a complementary fashion?

(7) “We should not rely on overly optimistic assumptions about the efficacy of an intervention, the response of the Syrian regime and its international allies, or our ability to manage the conflict.”
Neither should we paint an overly gloomy picture. Iran, Hezbollah and even Russia have very limited options to help Assad. What possible “response” from Syria’s allies should we have to fear?

(8) “Those hoping primarily to change the regime in Syria oppose diplomatic efforts which might reduce civilian deaths.”
This is true only if diplomacy stands a chance of ending the confilct in a foreseeable future and if one expects intervention to be long, bloody and undecisive. Neither of which can be assumed with certainty ex-ante.

(9) “Finally, the United States must not intervene without international legal authority. Acting without a UN Security Council resolution […] would risk deeply undermining both international institutions and American relations with Russia, China and the developing world.”
I agree that a UN mandate should be obtained if possible. I disagree that a UN mandate is indispensable. I also doubt the effects would be too dramatic. Has the Kosovo War deeply undermined US relations with Russia/China/RoW? Yugoslavia mattered much more to the Russians than Syria.

(10) “The support of Arab regional organizations and of NATO is important, but does not substitute for the UN.”
A “Uniting-for-Peace” resolution of the UN general assembly is an option that might have been worth mentioning.

(11) “Yet many Syrian anti-aircraft capabilities are located in or near urban areas, which means that significant civilian casualties could result from any attempt to eliminate them.”
I do not agree with this point. It is unclear what “significant civilian casualties” means in quantitative terms. Nato estimates that their bombing campaign in Yugoslavia cost 500 civilian lives. That’s the current toll of 1-2 weeks in Syria. Civilian casualties will undoubtedly occur, but Nato has over a decade more experience in avoiding collateral damage compared to the Kosovo campaign. In Libya we are talking about less than 100 civilians killed by Nato bombs.

(12) The author discusses a posisble air campaign exclusively from a regime change angle. Again, it is worth remembering that military and diplomatic pressure can and should go hand-in-hand. An air campaign does not necessarily have to end in regime change, but could force the regime to enter into genuine negotiations for a meaningful political transition. We should assume the regime is not planning to commit suicide. In the absence of a threat of military defeat they will not negotiate genuinely (as the author states himself). The mere threat of airstrikes may very well change that calculus, offering the possibly fastest and least bloody way to resolve the crisis.

(13) “Operation Provide Comfort, established in northern Iraq after 1991, was envisioned as a short-term crisis response, but turned into a 12-year commitment that ended only when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003.”
This comparison is disingenuous. The goal in 1991 was explicitly NOT regime change. Instead, the US chose to leave Saddam in power and we are coping with the negative ramifications of the lack of resolve at that time to the present day.

(14) “The United States and its partners could conduct an extended tactical air campaign … [b]ut in contrast to Libya, there are no front lines to police, few tank convoys to destroy on desert highways.”
I am very surprised that a lack of targets is brought up as an argument against intervention. Syrian heavy weapons would be extremely vulnerable when attacked from the air (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MljaV5zrcTg). Even more surprising is the assertion that tank convoys could not be easily spotted and attacked. Assad is moving his tanks back-and-forth on the Damasucus-Aleppo highway every day (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6N8Lv-Z14no). In large parts of the country (Reef Dimashq, Deraa, Derizor, parts of Aleppo province), Assad’s tank columns would be just as exposed and vulnerable as were Qadhafi’s.

(15) “Regime forces and the opposition are primarily clashing in densely packed urban areas. Civilian casualties would inevitably result from a bombing campaign against ill-defined targets in urban areas with extremely limited human intelligence. And such a campaign in support of a fragmented and weak opposition would almost certainly escalate.”
Again, I believe the concern for civilian casualties of Nato bombings is exaggerated. Lots of fighting in Libya supported by Nato jets took place in urban areas (Zawiya, Tripoli, Misurata, Sirte). Nonetheless, the number of civilian casualties is in the dozens, not the hundreds. In my opinion, this risk is blown out of proportion.

(16) “Providing arms to the opposition would not likely allow it to prevail over the Syrian military.”
Again, Adm. Stavridis believes otherwise.

(17) “What is more, the Syrian opposition remains fragmented, disorganized and highly localized. Providing weapons will privilege favored groups within the opposition, discredit advocates of non-military strategies, and likely lead to ever more expansive goals.”
The discussion ignores that the availability of weapons to, say the SNC, would contribute to unify the ranks of the opposition. It would also help establish political control over the military opposition. They’ll get weapons/supplies only if they follow the orders of the political body. So it is true that supplying weapons would privilege some groups over others, but this would not necessarily need ot be a bad thing.

(18) “It should also be sobering that the best example offered of historical success of such a strategy is the American support to the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union, which led to the collapse of the Afghan state, the rise of the Taliban, and the evolution of al-Qaeda.”
The comparison of Syria with Afghanistan is disingenuous for obvious reasons. Syria has a popular movement calling for democracy, which was completely absent in Afghanistan.

(19) “But international diplomacy does not depend on Assad’s good intentions. Instead, it aims to demilitarize the conflict and create the political space for change driven by Syrians disgusted by the destruction of their country.”
Obviously, the problem is not a lack of people disgusted by the regime. The problem is that Assad has loyal military units that are prepared to shoot as many people as it takes to keep him in power. It is inconceivable to me how one can possibly talk about “political space for change” under the conditions we currently have in Syria.

(20) “There has been a noticeable upsurge in peaceful protests across Syria since the ceasefire came into effect.”
At the same time, there are credible reports that those who talked to the monitors have been tracked down and killed. Why not mention that, too?

(21) “There are no guarantees that the current UN plan will succeed either, but it must be given the opportunity to develop.”
Important questions remain. How long should we stick with the Annan plan? Under what conditions should we concede that diplomatic efforts have failed? If we were to wake up one day, realizing the regime has not been and will not be responsive to diplomatic pressure and sanctions…what next?

I hope that the alternative perspectives and interpretations I have provided can be used constructively in further discussion on the topic.

On the ‘difficulties’ of arming Syrian insurgents

Among the options to bring about the fall of Bashar al-Assad, arming and training opposition forces has been repeatedly suggested. While lots of bold speech came from the Qataris and Saudis there is no evidence that they have followed up on their words. At the same time, it seems safe to say no Western nation has an intention of doing so any time soon.

Critics say there are a lot of drawbacks. Controlling weapons flows in a volatile region is one of them. There are several other concerns, but this one is among the most important, so I will focus this post on it.

How to make sure the weapons, say MILAN anti-tank missiles, do not end up in the wrong hands? After all, these systems have black market prices in the $100.000s and they are supposed to be shipped into a country in which $500 is a good monthly salary.

Sadly, the discussionso far widely ignores there are means to avoid or at least severely restrict the possibility that these arms are passed on to others. If administered in a pragmatic and prudent manner, we should be able to establish a reasonable level of control.

For instance, arms could (and should) only be distributed to insurgents that have gone through a formal registration process including full ID and biometric data. The insurgents should be advised and trained in the use of the weapons in a safe third-country (e.g. Qatar or Turkey). Why are we selling arms to other armies, like Uganda, Georgia or Botswana? Because we believe they have a military organization that can keep track of them. Supplying arms to a well-trained and properly organized rebel militia, funded by Gulf states would be just as safe from a proliferation perspective.

Moreover, it is possible to monitor and track the weapons via GPS (as we do with criminals like George Zimmerman). As more or less the whole middle east is in reach of US or Turkish special forces. If some of the weapons ended up in Northern Iraq or elsewhere where we would not want it, tracking them down would not be a problem.

Another way to prohibit misuse of weapons supplies is to secure them with a code which changes in regular timeframes (I’m talking about TOWs and the like, not ordinary guns, which are readily available in Syria anyway). Only if the right code is known, the weapon can be used.  Once the code has expired, the weapon is rendered useless. The new code will only be known to the military that supplied the weapon. So when the weapon is being sold to a third party, they may have fun with it for a very limited time only. This greatly limits the long-term concerns of the policy in question. Technically, it can be done very easily today.

Finally, almost needless to say, in order to use an anti-tank missile one needs both the laucher and missiles. While the launcher may be traded to a third party if the arms trafficker somehow manages to avoid the above mentioned obstacles, the resupply of missiles can immediately be canceled. The possible damage of proliferation of the launcher system is limited when only few missiles are passed on to insurgents at a time (as should be done). For any other insurgent group not allied with the West, it wld be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to procure anti-tank missiles that can be used with a Javelin or MILAN launcher system.

To sum up the above discussion, weapons proliferation is a valid concern, but if arms are supplied in a prudent manner, the risk seems manageable.

Libya transition on right track

Libya on right track

Bashing the Libya intervention and making doom-and-gloom prophecies is quite popular among apologists of Qadhafi (and Bashar Al-Assad btw). Libyans themselves provide the perfect answer to this.

Blog & Twitter

Just trying to figure out how all this works. Could be a useful thing when I have to trumpet something to the world that has more than 140 chars via twitter.

Hello world!

Starting to blog unsolicited comments and opinions here as of now. Views are my own and the usual disclaimer applies.