The debate over the right approach to the tragedy that is unfolding in Syria has sharply polarized the foreign policy community. In the past months, advocates of stronger US involvement seemed irreconcilably opposed to proponents of non-involvement—a rift that divides academia, political analysts, Capitol Hill and even the national security team of President Obama. However, as the fighting escalates, the two sides appeared to hesitantly converge on some aspects. Critics of intervention might have noted that the option of a Libya-style bombing campaign has widely disappeared from the discourse. At the same time, even proponents of a hands-off approach grudgingly concede that a workable strategy to alleviate the suffering must include some military elements.
It appeared to me that the latest policy brief of Dr. Lynch corroborates this trend (henceforth, direct quotes from the document appear in bold). Although the focus remains on avoiding direct US involvement, many in the more hawkish camp might find themselves nodding along with many points that are being made. First and foremost, there seems to be consensus over the objective for Syria. Both sides would likely subscribe to the objective defined by former ambassador Frederic C. Hof: a Syria with an inclusive civil society and government that is inclined to cooperate with the US, breaks with Iran and Hezbollah, renounces terrorism, and commits to nonviolence and the Middle East peace process. There is also consensus that no decent outcome can be achieved with a political arrangement that includes President Bashar al-Assad who is “too fully implicated in massive atrocities to be included in any political transition” implying that “the US should remain focused on the ultimate objective of replacing the Assad regime”. Similarly, hawks and doves cry out in unison for the delivery of direct humanitarian aid to opposition-held areas, if necessary without UN backing, and for greater efforts to organize and unify the opposition in exile. Finally, there is consensus that Assad and his cronies must be prosecuted and that “there should be no tradeoff between expediency and justice” (remember Hillary Clinton’s bizarre charade).
The most controversial point is obviously the recommendation not to arm the rebels. I would like to focus on this issue and highlight some aspects where one might possibly come to other conclusions. Lest my comments seem overly critical, I would like to emphasize that I agree on many (perhaps most) of the arguments of the policy brief. My presentation will focus on the more controversial points to stimulate the debate and avoid redundancy.
A convincing case for arming the Syrian rebels would have to satisfy three main conditions:
(1) The arms must provide a tangible military advantage that allows rebels to challenge Assad’s grip on his strongholds.
(2) The political and military risks of providing the weapons must be managable.
(3) The provision of arms must facilitate, not impede, a diplomatic settlement.
Condition 1: military edge. Perhaps the most serious argument brought forth against arming the rebels is that it might not significantly change the realities on the ground: “Those who advocated arming the rebels did not offer a convincing case that these arms would tip the balance of the conflict”. To predict how arming the rebels would impact the military balance, it is important to look at the capabilities of both sides.
To begin with, many observers have grossly overstated the strength of Assad’s military. It is getting increasingly obvious that the rebels are fighting an incompetent army whose equipment belongs in a museum. As pointed out by Jeffrey White, a military analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, the regime has three main advantages over the rebels: (1) heavy armor and mechanized brigades, (3) indirect fire weapons and artillery, and (3) its airforce. According to another analysis, the main military challenge for the rebels is attacking bases and airfields that lay in flat terrain that can easily be defended against an infantry onslaught even by a small garrison. Several military bases lay under siege across the country (e.g., Menakh airbase, Aleppo international airport, Wadi Al-Dayf military base) with ill-equipped rebels being unable to deal the final blow.
Indirect fire weapons and anti-tank guided missiles would change the equation significantly, giving the rebels the ability to attack tanks and buildings from a distance, disable runways and destroy aircraft on the ground.
At the moment, however, they have just a handful of METIS anti-tank systems and only a few old mortars and field guns across the country. More of these weapons and a more steady and reliable supply of ammunition could enable the rebels to close all three gaps to the regime that remain in terms of military capability within a reasonable amount of time.
Despite their limited weaponry, the rebels have already captured some airfields. Further, the Syrian airforce suffers due to the rebels’ (limited) access to anti-aircraft weapons and “the strains put on its fleet by its own operational tempo”. Giving the rebels the ability to attack and capture regime bases and airfields more quickly would deal a significant blow to the regime. US military brass go as far as predicting the regime would collapse if its airforce could be defeated:
A more abundant and reliable arms supply would allow the rebels to capture remaining airfields in the North, cut off supply routes of key cities (Aleppo, Raqqa, Deir Al-Zour) and seize them eventually. After consolidating their hold on the northern provinces, the insurgents could advance to the coastal city of Lattakia and threaten Assad’s tribal heartland. Even today, Assad’s hometown Qardaha is almost within reach of the insurgents. However, absent more firepower, their progress is painfully slow and still too often, they find themselves outgunned, fighting tanks with only light weapons.
We do not know the details of the plan that Mr Petraeus and then-secretary Clinton have proposed last year. What we can say is that it was convincing enough to earn the support of some of the highest civilian and military leaders of the United States. What is more, the case that providing weapons to the rebels would help them push Assad from power had already been made by Admiral James Stavridis in March 2012 at a time when the insurgency was still in its infancy.
Assad will not agree to a negotiated exit as long as he thinks he is winning. Military pressure is the only way to make him change his calculus. As things stand right now, arming the rebels is the only feasible way to achieve this goal. Needless to say, this would not mean to enable the rebels to overrun the whole country and defeat his army in its entirety. The objective of arming the rebels would be to make his situation militarily untenable so that he (or his Alawite backers) agree to hand over power.
Condition 2: managable risks. Naturally, providing arms to Syrian insurgents is not without risks, the most important one being that arms flows cannot be fully controlled and at least some of them may end up in the hands of extremists. It goes without saying that arms should not be dropped with parachutes over opposition-held areas. Instead, any weapons should be provided to carefully vetted groups that are willing to work constructively with the West during the revolt and after Assad has been removed. No weapons that could endanger Israel or the armed forces of Western allies in the region should be supplied. Antitank weaponry can be calibrated to pierce lower-grade Syrian armor without posing a threat to more advanced Israeli or Western-made tanks. Older generation anti-tank missiles and artillery are unlikely to pose a significant threat to a well-equipped army.
Of course, residual risks will remain and the months after Assad falls will need tireless efforts to integrate the various militias into a framework of national security forces and to encourage people to hand in or sell their arms (whoever supplied them) to government institutions. The policy brief states that “most of the weapons which [the US] might plausibly offer would not be enough to defeat the Syrian military”. However, as outlined above, there might be no need for shoulder-fired missiles, which are the most delicate and risky items. This assumption is echoed, among others, by a former marine who has travelled with the rebels for several weeks (and is now reportedly in regime custody):
Condition 3: facilitating a political solution. All parties of the conflict accept that there must be a political solution, not a military solution in which one side conquers the other. The Khatib initiative, though badly timed, ill-conceived and amateurishly communicated, provides a glimmer of hope that “… parts of the opposition and parts of the Syrian regime are finally reaching the point where they could contemplate a deal.” However, there is one person that does not seem to be in the mood for negotiations: Bashar el-Assad has no intentions of stepping aside.
Rather than seeing diplomacy and military assistance as mutually exclusive strategies, they should be used in a complementary fashion to hasten the regime’s demise. This is how similar conflicts were brought to an end. Analysts often invoke the civil war in Bosnia as a parallel for Syria. In this conflict, a political solution was hammered out through nonstop diplomatic efforts of the US and her partners. However, few would argue that the steadily increasing military pressure was a major factor in bringing Milosevic to the negotiating table. This only happened after the West canceled the arms embargo against Bosnian rebels and the fortune in the battlefield shifted decisively against the Serbs with key regions like the Krajina being overrun by Croatian forces and other defeats looming.
Diplomacy can only prevail if the opposition makes military gains up to a point that Assad sees the light or his Alawite backers feel ready to jettison him. Right now, Assad is still seen as a savior for too many in the Alawite community that keeps him in power. Until we come to a point where Assad becomes their problem, no political solution can be brought about. Providing arms to the rebels would not supplant the diplomatic track. It would not mean giving up on a negotiated settlement and banking on a military victory of the opposition. What it could do is to help convince Assad that his time is up and thereby pave the way for a political solution.
The US government might finally decide that the drawbacks of providing arms directly to the rebels weigh too heavily. Nonetheless, it will have to deal with a situation in which weapons from different sources are already flowing into Syria. In this environment, the policy brief suggests that the US “coordinate the military and civilian aid that Syria is already receiving” rather than “adding American arms to the bazaar”. Vetting rebel groups and tracing the flows of arms would help reconcile conflicting objectives among US partners involved in Syria, but it would not be enough to affect the trajectory of the conflict. In order to change the military realities on the ground and Assad’s calculations, the US would have to support and encourage US allies to provide weapons more effectively, more accountably and in greater quantities.
Syria has reached a point where military assistance and diplomatic efforts are two sides of the same medal. One cannot succeed without the other.
jonasrenz 